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The course of performance doctrine plays a significant role in
American contract law. The theoretical debate over the doctrine
revolves around one central question—What is the intention of the
parties regarding the application of the doctrine? Proponents of the
doctrine believe that its application reflects the actual intention of the
parties. In contrast, opponents of the doctrine believe that the doctrine
stands contrary to the intention of the parties.
Despite the widespread debate over the course of performance doctrine,
there are no quantitative empirical studies aimed at directly exposing
the parties’ true intention about the doctrine. This Article aims to fill
this research void by empirically analyzing actual anti-course of
performance clauses in commercial contracts. By examining 1,550
commercial contracts that have been disclosed to the Securities and
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Exchange Commission, this Article finds that a clear majority (80.06%)
of contracts include an anti-course of performance clause. In addition,
the results of this study indicate that the anti-course of performance
clauses included in the sample contracts are not mere arbitrary
boilerplates that were randomly added to the contracts. More
specifically, this study found a significant statistical association between
the inclusion of an anti-course of performance clause in a contract and
the inclusion of a variety of other related clauses, such as anti-waiver
and anti-assignment clauses.
The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
The course of performance doctrine—under which a contract can
be modified by the post-contractual conduct of the parties1—is a basic
building block of U.S. contract law.2 The desirability of the doctrine,
however, has been a source of intense theoretical debate and contro-
versy among legal scholars.3 The central theoretical argument that
proponents of the doctrine present is that its application reflects the
actual intention of the parties.4 Interestingly enough, the major theo-
retical argument presented by opponents of the doctrine is quite the
opposite: the doctrine stands contrary to the intention of the parties.5
While the theoretical debate over the course of performance doc-
trine is profound, extensive, and ongoing, there are no systematic em-
pirical studies aimed at directly exposing the parties’ true intention
about the doctrine. Specifically, there are no studies concentrating on
the frequency with which anti-course of performance clauses, which
aim to prevent the application of the doctrine, are included by the
parties in real-world contracts. The study contained in this Article
aims to fill this research void.
Focusing on the preferences of sophisticated parties to commercial
contracts, this Article analyzes 1,550 commercial contracts disclosed
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The results of the
study reveal that the majority of contracts (80.06%) include an anti-
course of performance clause, known as a “no-oral-modification
1. See infra Part I.
2. Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of Commercial Impracticability,
13 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2014) (“Usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of perform-
ance are mainstays of contract law . . . .”).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part II.
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clause” (NOM clause).6 This clause stipulates that all modifications of
the contract be made only in writing. The results also indicate that
NOM clauses are not mere boilerplates that are inadvertently added
to the contracts. Particularly, the study found a significant statistical
association between the existence of a NOM clause and the existence
of other related clauses—such as anti-waiver, anti-assignment, and no-
tices clauses—which require the post-contractual actions of the parties
to be made only in writing.7
This Article is structured as follows: Parts I and II will provide con-
text by briefly reviewing the course of performance doctrine and the
context underlining the theoretical debate over the desirability of the
doctrine. Part III will present the empirical test of this study. It will
review the data and discuss the methodology used for empirically test-
ing the frequency with which a NOM clause is included in commercial
contracts between sophisticated parties. It will also examine the statis-
tical association between the NOM clause and related clauses. Part IV
will discuss the normative implications of the empirical results.
I. THE COURSE OF PERFORMANCE DOCTRINE—AN OVERVIEW
A course of performance is legally defined as the sequence of con-
duct between the parties to the contract.8 It normally exists when two
conditions are met: “(1) the agreement of the parties with respect to
the transaction involves repeated occasions for performance by
a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the
performance and opportunity for objection to it, accepts the perform-
ance or acquiesces in it without objection.”9
According to the general rules of contract law, the course of per-
formance doctrine has one major implication, which is the focus of
this paper: a written contract may be modified by course of perform-
ance.10 As Professor Hillman illustrates, if a gardener and her client
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.E.
8. U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013); Fire Supply & Serv., Inc. v.
Chico Hot Springs, 639 P.2d 1160, 1164 (Mont. 1982); J.W.S. Delavau, Inc. v. Eastern Am. Trans-
port and Warehousing, Inc., 810 A.2d 672, 683–84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); 2 E. ALLAN FARNS-
WORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 329 (3rd ed. 2004); JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 150
(7th ed. 2014).
9. U.C.C. § 1-303(a). The common law adopted similar conditions as the ones used in the
U.C.C. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 330; ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THE- R
ORY 140 (2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (AM. LAW. INST.
1981).
10. U.C.C. § 1-303(f) (“[A] course of performance is relevant to show a . . . modification of
any term inconsistent with the course of performance.”); Kaplan v. Old Mut. PLC, 526 F. App’x
70, 72 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Dallas Aerospace, Inc., v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 783 (2d Cir.
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agree that the gardener will mow the client’s lawn every Saturday dur-
ing the summer, but during the month of July the gardener actually
mowed the lawn every Sunday without the client objecting, then
course of performance may have modified the contract, thus requiring
Sunday mowing.11
A modification of a contract by course of performance normally
incorporates several noteworthy implications: First, the modification
may terminate certain rights afforded under the original agreement
(e.g., the client’s right to have the lawn mowed on Saturday).12 Sec-
ond, the modification can add new duties, by either expanding existing
duties or imposing new duties on the parties (e.g., the client’s new
duty to accept Sunday mowing).13 Third, the new modified contract is
2003)) (“Under New York law, ‘parties may modify a contract “by . . . course of performance
. . . .” ’”); Lauderdale Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Enter. Consol. Sch. Dist., 24 F.3d 671,
687 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Under Mississippi state law, the subsequent actions of the parties may
modify the contract . . . .”); Davidson v. Yihai Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 282 (D. Mass. 2002)
(“Under Illinois law, ‘[a] contract is validly modified if the party which did not propose the
changes is shown to acquiesce in the modification through a course of conduct.’”); Safeguard
Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Hoeffel, No. 89-2444-O, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1334, at *13 n.3 (D. Kan. 1991)
(“Kansas follows the general rule of contract law that terms of a written contract may be modi-
fied by the parties’ mutual course of conduct.”); Motown Record Corp. v. Mary Jane Girls, Inc.,
650 F. Supp. 123, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“California law permits the modification of a contract by
conduct.”); Trident Elec., Inc. v. John S. Clark, Inc., CH05-532, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 5, at *12
(Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008) (“Under North Carolina law, while the provisions of a written contract
are generally enforced, they can absolutely be . . . modified by the conduct and actions of the
parties.”); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 781, 790 (1999) (“[I]n a long line of cases courts have held that course of perform-
ance can trump conflicting terms in the contract.”); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS 478–79 (5th ed. 2011) (“[C]ourse of performance . . . may constitute a modification
of the contract.”); PERILLO, supra note 8, at 153 (“A course of performance may add a term to R
the agreement or subtract one.”). Notably, the course of performance doctrine has another less
dramatic implication than contract modification: a course of conduct may be relevant in ascer-
taining the meaning of an expression in the parties’ agreement. See U.C.C. § 1-303(d); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW
254 (2d ed. 2009) (“[C]ourse of performance evidence may help determine what a reasonable
person would believe an ambiguous [term] means.”); MURRAY, supra note 10, at 478 (“[C]ourse
of performance evidence is admissible to interpret the expressions of the parties.”); PERILLO,
supra note 8, at 153 (“A course of performance may also be relevant on the issue of meaning.”). R
11. HILLMAN, supra note 10, at 254; Similarly, if a buyer is contractually entitled to receive R
seven shipments of goods at a specific location, but has accepted three times, and without objec-
tion, delivery at a different location, then course of performance may modify the contract.
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More is Not Always Better than Less—An Exploration in Property
Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 710–11 (2008).
12. Int’l Bus. Lists v. AT&T, 147 F.3d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A modification of a contract
is a change in one or more respects which introduces new elements into the details of the con-
tract and cancels others.”); PERILLO, supra note 8, at 153 (“A course of performance may . . . R
subtract” a term from the agreement).
13. MURRAY, supra note 10, at 479 (“[C]ourse of performance may provide new terms . . . .”); R
PERILLO, supra note 8, at 153 (“A course of performance may add a term to the agreement R
. . . .”).
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legally binding, as was the original contract.14 Fourth, the modification
of the agreement cannot be withdrawn unilaterally by one of the par-
ties, rather only by mutual agreement between the parties (e.g., the
gardener and her client).15
A course of performance, which may constitute contract modifica-
tion, should be distinguished from two related principles of contract
law: course of dealing and trade of usage. While course of perform-
ance occurs after the contract was made,16 course of dealing concerns
the conduct of the parties prior to contract formation.17 In addition,
while course of performance focuses on the particular relationship be-
tween the parties, usage of trade is a general practice that can be regu-
larly observed in a particular commercial industry.18
14. Meijer v. Thompson, 655 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614 (E.D. Va. 2009) (“[A] modification is . . .
binding”); Martin H. Brinkley, The Regulation of Contractual Change: A Guide to No Oral Mod-
ification Clauses for North Carolina Lawyers, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2239, 2253 (2003) (“Modifications
are themselves contracts, . . . having the full permanent and binding effect of an original
agreement.”).
15. Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 436 N.E.2d 1265, 1269 (N.Y. 1982)
(“A modification . . . may only be withdrawn by agreement.”); see also Williams v. Chapman, 22
A.D.3d 1015, 1017 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
16. FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 329 (A course of performance “consists of conduct subse- R
quent to the agreement . . . .”); PERILLO, supra note 8, at 150 (“[A] course of performance R
involves conduct after the agreement has been made . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
17. U.C.C. § 1-303(b) (“A ‘course of dealing’ is a sequence of conduct concerning previous
transactions between the parties . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(1) (AM.
LAW. INST. 1981) (“A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties
. . . .”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 329 (stating that course of performance “should not be R
confused with a ‘course of dealing,’ which consists of conduct prior to the agreement in ques-
tion.”); HILLMAN, supra note 10, at 254 (“The main difference between a course of dealing and R
course of performance lies in when the conduct takes place. If the conduct occurred as part of a
particular contract it is called a course of performance. If the conduct occurred prior to the
contract at issue it is called a course of dealing.”); PERILLO, supra note 8, at 150 (“A course of R
dealing relates to the conduct prior to the agreement.”) (emphasis omitted); see also JAMES
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 140 (6th ed. 2010).
18. U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (“A ‘usage of trade’ is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 222 (“A usage of trade is a usage having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or
trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to a particular agree-
ment.”); cf. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 589–91; William H. Widen, The Arbitrage of R
Truth: Combating Dissembling Disclosure, Derivatives, and the Ethic of Technical Compli-
ance, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 414 (2012) (“[T]he usage reflected in the course of performance
of the particular contract takes priority over prior use between the parties in previous contracts
or the language use prevalent in the trade in general.”) (emphasis added). In addition, while a
course of performance can be normally proved by the testimony of the parties, trade usage is
usually proved by expert testimony. See PERILLO, supra note 8, at 151. R
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II. THE THEORETICAL DEBATE OVER COURSE OF PERFORMANCE
Proponents of the course of performance doctrine base their sup-
port for the doctrine mainly on an intention-of-the-parties rationale.
They particularly argue, on a theoretical level, that the parties’ course
of performance during the contractual relationship is the strongest in-
dication of the parties’ true intentions as to the scope of their mutual
obligations.19 This argument rests on an assumption that the parties’
intentions are dynamic rather than static.20 When making the written
contract, the parties intended to be governed by said formal con-
tract.21 However, as their contractual relationship evolves, the parties’
mutual subjective intention evolves to modify their obligations to
meet changing circumstances.22 This new intention is inferred from
the parties’ repeated course of conduct.23 In such case, the course of
performance doctrine appropriately prefers the parties’ new, ex post
intention, reflected in their repeated conduct, over their ex ante inten-
tion, reflected in their one-time written contract.24
19. John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of Llewellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 263, 341 (2000) (The course of performance doctrine suggests “that the parties’ intent may
be found in their actual conduct.”); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 711 (“The common R
explanation for the [course of performance] doctrine is that the parties’ conduct during perform-
ance is the best indicator of their actual intentions and of the modifications they have agreed
to.”); John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the “Battle of the Forms”: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV.
1307, 1314 (1986) (The parties’ course of performance “not only will provide the strongest evi-
dence of their contract’s intended meaning; it also will operate to overcome their previously
expressed terms.”); John E. Murray, Jr., The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 DUQ. L.
REV. 533, 566 (1997) (“Course of performance provides the strongest evidence of what the par-
ties intended by the original terms and can also operate as a modification of such terms . . . .”);
PERILLO, supra note 8, at 153 (“A course of performance is often the best evidence of the par- R
ties’ intentions.”); Frank A. Rothermel, Comment, Role of Course of Performance and Confir-
matory Memoranda in Determining the Scope, Operation and Effect of “No Oral Modification”
Clauses, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1239, 1252–53 (1987) (“[T]he parties’ course of performance in
executing their contract was perhaps the most important and reliable evidence of the parties’
true intent concerning their  contractual obligations.”); David V. Snyder, Language and Formali-
ties in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617, 643
(2001) (“Course of performance is good evidence of what the terms of the contract are consid-
ered to be by the parties, and that is precisely the goal of assent-based construction.”).
20. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 788. R
21. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 788. R
22. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 788. R
23. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 788; see also MURRAY, supra note 10, at 479 (“If the parties R
have knowingly engaged in repeated occasions of performance which are inconsistent with the
express terms of the contract, they have manifested their intention to modify their contract.”).
24. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 788 (“[B]y integrating the parties’ past practices into the R
relationship, the law favors the parties’ ex post intention over their ex ante, ‘historical’ intention
. . . .”); Robert A. Hillman, Comment: More in Defense of U.C.C. Methodology, 62 LA. L. REV.
1153, 1157 n.40 (2002) (“[A] court . . . may strike a term barring evidence of a subsequent course
of performance on the theory that the parties ex post conduct shows their intention to disregard
the written term.”); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71
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According to proponents of the doctrine, the course of performance
doctrine is the best indication of the parties’ intention. This is sup-
ported by three major benefits that the doctrine hypothetically pro-
vides to the parties.
First, the course of performance doctrine facilitates the flexibility of
the parties during the contractual relationship.25 More specifically,
this argument is based on an assumption that contractual relationships
often informally adjust to changing circumstances.26 For example, if a
buyer is suddenly short of warehouse space during a contractual deliv-
ery period, the seller may delay the delivery in accordance with the
buyer’s interest and in contrast with the written contract.27 Given the
existence of dynamic, informal adjustments during the contract, there
is often a disparity between these adjustments and the written con-
tract.28 When such disparities exist, the course of performance doc-
trine “facilitates flexible and informal adjustments of contractual
FORDHAM. L. REV. 869, 893 (2002) [hereinafter Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism]
(“Where a course of performance differs from the express terms, it constitutes a modification . . .
of the express terms because it is a clear and current manifestation that the parties have changed
their minds.”); Corneill A. Stephens, On Ending the Battle of the Forms: Problems with Solu-
tions, 80 KY. L.J. 815, 838 (1992) (“By expressly including . . . course of performance . . . when
the contract results from conduct, an attempt to reach the intention of the parties is assured.”).
25. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 711 (stating that the course of performance doctrine R
“facilitates flexible and informal adjustments of contractual obligations.”); see also Ben-
Shahar, supra note 10, at 784 n.19 (“Most commentators seem to believe that doctrines like . . . R
course of performance increase the flexibility of the relationships.”); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant
Law in a Modern Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 238, 257
(Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Merchant Law in a Modern Economy] (stating that
the course of performance doctrine was “designed to encourage work-a-day contractual flexibil-
ity . . . .”).
26. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc., 737 F.3d 966, 971 (5th Cir.
2013) (“[T]he undisputed evidence shows that the parties’ course of performance indicates that
they consistently made adjustments to the amount of payment due at a time after the contract
payment date . . . .”); Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the
Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 312
(1998) (“Adjustments during the course of performance have become so routine in certain in-
dustries . . . .”); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1455 (2004)
(“[A]s any contract lawyer knows, the administration even of the very simplest joint plan re-
quires constant addition, revision, and adjustment over the course of its performance.”); Eyal
Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1710, 1765 (1997) (arguing that the gap between the parties’ set of legal rights and obliga-
tions and their course of performance “is reflected in the adaptation of the contract to changing
circumstances and to changes in the parties’ wishes . . . .”).
27. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1744 (2001) [hereinafter Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry].
28. Zamir, supra note 26, at 1765 (“Empirical research indicates that there is a wide gap be- R
tween the parties’ set of ‘legal’ rights and obligations and their actual behavior during the per-
formance of the contract.”).
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obligations.”29 It particularly does so by informally modifying the con-
tract according to the parties’ course of performance, thereby elimi-
nating the transaction costs needed to formally rewrite the contract in
accordance with such performance.30
Second, the course of performance doctrine protects the reasonable
reliance of a relying party. More concretely, when one contractual
party repeatedly allows a practice to go without objection, she may
create an expectation on the part of the other party that this practice
has become part of the contractual relationship.31 In order to protect
the reliance interest of the relying party, the doctrine allows that
party’s course of conduct to modify the written contract.32
Third, the doctrine allows the parties to correct incompleteness er-
rors that they have made during the formation of the contract.33 These
errors typically occur when the parties, while drafting the contract,
unintentionally overlook a low-probability scenario which may have
significant ramifications for the parties.34 However, during the con-
tractual relationship, the parties’ repeated experience with a low-
probability scenario may generate a course of performance between
the parties regarding this scenario.35 In such a case, the course of per-
formance doctrine, by modifying the contract, provides the parties
29. Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at 711; see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 784 n.19 R
(“Most commentators seem to believe that doctrines like . . . course of performance increase the
flexibility of the relationships.”); Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewel-
lyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325, 336
(1995) (“‘Course of performance’ was to be given legal effect to allow for binding adjustments to
be made . . . .”).
30. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 788 (The course of performance doctrine “saves the parties R
the transaction cost of formally redrafting the bargain.”); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 11, at R
711 (stating that the course of performance doctrine creates “saving on the transaction costs to
the parties of negotiating contract modifications.”).
31. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 789 (“[W]hen a party allows a conflicting practice to go R
unchallenged even though she has the right to enforce the explicit provisions of the contract, she
creates an expectation on the part of the other party that she will not enforce the explicit provi-
sions prospectively.”) (emphasis omitted).
32. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 789 (“In order to protect the reliance interest of a party who R
incurs opportunity costs while reasonably expecting an ongoing practice to persist, the law allows
the ongoing practice to override the explicit provisions.”).
33. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 279 (1985)
(“[A] course of . . . performance also reduces what we have described as incompleteness error.”).
34. Id. at 270 (“This ‘incompleteness error’ typically occurs when the parties inadvertently
overlook a potentially important, but low probability contingency.”); see also Michal Shur-Ofry
& Ofer M. Tur-Sinai, Constructive Ambiguity: IP Licenses as a Case Study, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 391, 399 (2015) (“[A] contract may simply avoid addressing a certain scenario or its
consequences, despite their potential relevance to the transaction.”).
35. Goetz & Scott, supra note 33, at 279 (“But repeated experience with low-probability R
events tends to reveal patterns of behavior between the parties.”).
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with specific terms for handling low-probability scenarios, thereby fix-
ing incompleteness errors.36
Opponents of the course of performance doctrine argue, on a theo-
retical level, that the application of the doctrine stands contrary to the
parties’ intentions.37 This argument rests on an assumption that the
parties have two different types of intentions. The first type relates to
the question of how typical, non-litigated issues should be handled by
the parties during their contractual relationship.38 Consider, for exam-
ple, a contract for the sale of feed between a buyer and a seller. The
agreement may include an official weight provision demanding the
seller to provide the buyer with a federally-supervised weight certifi-
cate.39 However, small buyers and sellers of feed may often intend
that throughout their contractual relationship they will accept the
seller’s unsupervised in-house weights, given the high cost of official
weights.40 The second type of intention relates to the question of how
atypical, litigated cases should be formally treated by courts.41 For ex-
ample, the small feed merchandisers may often desire that the official
weight provisions in their contracts will be strictly applied by courts in
a litigated dispute.42
36. Goetz & Scott, supra note 33, at 279 (“By increasing the supply of party-specific terms, the R
state thus promotes reductions in incompleteness risks.”). Relatedly, it is theoretically argued
that the course of performance doctrine can fix “administrative errors” (e.g. typos) by modifying
the written contract in accordance with the parties’ course of performance, which reflects their
accurate intention. Id. at 268, 279.
37. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 592 (2003) (“[T]he courts’ use of course of performance evidence to establish a
change in meaning reflects a misunderstanding of the parties’ likely intentions.”).
38. Id. at 593–94 (“The parties’ amicable behavior after the contract likely evidences only
their view regarding how the average case should be treated . . . . Their actions under the con-
tract will evidence their intentions for typical cases . . . .”).
39. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Im-
manent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1764–65 n.96 (1996) [hereinafter Merchant
Law in a Merchant Court].
40. Id. at 1799 (“[W]hile smaller feed merchandisers who transact primarily on a local or
regional basis often include official weight provisions in their contracts, they routinely accept
one another’s unsupervised in-house weights.”).
41. Id. at 1796 (“[T]he terms of transactors’ written contracts, . . . contain the norms that
transactors would want a third-party neutral to apply in a situation where they were unable to
cooperatively resolve a dispute and viewed their relationship as being at an end-game stage.”);
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 593–94 (“When business parties incur costs to cast obliga- R
tions in written form, they do so partly to permit a party to stand on its rights under the written
contract when standing on its rights matters . . . . Courts . . . see the unusual case that the
contract was written to govern.”).
42. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1799 (stating that contracts of small R
feed merchandisers often include an “explicit contractual provision embodying the desired [end-
game norm applied by courts]—a provision requiring official weights.”).
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Given these two different types of intentions by the parties, oppo-
nents of the course of performance doctrine believe that the parties’
course of conduct during the contractual relationship evidences only
their first type of intention, namely how non-litigated issues should be
handled by the parties themselves during their relationship.43 In con-
trast, the content of the formal written contract evidences the parties’
second type of intention, namely how a litigated case should be for-
mally handled by courts.44 Accordingly, a court is likely to make an
error when it relies on the parties’ course of performance to conclude
how the parties intended their disputed case to be resolved by a
court.45
According to opponents of the doctrine, the theoretical argument
that the course of performance doctrine stands in contrast with the
intention of the parties is supported by three major supposed
disadvantages.
First, the doctrine discourages contractual flexibility by the parties
during their relationship,46 as opposed to the prediction made by pro-
ponents of the doctrine.47 More specifically, proponents predict that a
contract party would often wish to behave flexibly towards the other
party during the life of the contract in order to preserve their contrac-
tual relationship.48 However, if a party to a contract anticipates that
courts will use its flexibility, as reflected in its course of performance,
to impose legal duties on it in future disputes between the parties, it
43. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 593–94 (“The parties’ amicable behavior after the
contract likely evidences only their view regarding how the average case should be treated . . . .
Their actions under the contract will evidence their intentions for typical cases.”).
44. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 593–94 (“When business parties incur costs to cast
obligations in written form, they do so partly to permit a party to stand on its rights under the
written contract when standing on its rights matters . . . . Courts . . . see the unusual case that the
contract was written to govern.”).
45. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 594 (“[A] court is likely to make a category mistake
when it relies on parties’ behavior in nonlitigated cases to infer how parties want a litigated case
to be treated.”).
46. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1808 (stating that under the course R
of performance doctrine, the parties are “less likely to flexibly adjust their contractual obliga-
tions.”); Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, supra note 25, at 257 (arguing that the course of R
performance doctrine was “designed to encourage work-a-day contractual flexibility; yet [it is]
likely to have precisely the opposite effect.”); Jack W. Graves, Course of Performance as Evi-
dence of Intent or Waiver: A Meaningful Preference for the Latter and Implications for Newly
Broadened Use Under Revised UCC Section 1-303, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 235, 277 (2004) (“If we
really want to encourage the greatest degree of flexible cooperation between the parties to an
agreement, the best approach would be to bar all evidence of their postformation conduct in
deciding their respective rights and duties.”).
47. See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text. R
48. Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, supra note 25, at 257 (“In the course of business R
operations, there are adjustments that transactors find it worthwhile to make at a particular
point in time . . . .”); see also Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1796. R
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will be less likely to behave flexibly toward the other party in the first
place.49 The course of performance doctrine might therefore inef-
ficiently deter contractual parties from being flexible,50 creating what
some legal scholars label as a “rigidity effect.”51 As Professor Hillman
illustrates, under the doctrine, when a lawn owner lets her gardener
mow her lawn on a few successive Sundays, although the written con-
tract calls for mowing on Saturdays, the owner may lose the contrac-
tual right to insist that the gardener mow the lawn on Saturdays.52 As
a result, the owner might “rigidly insist” that the gardener mow her
lawn only on Saturdays, in order to avoid losing her contractual
right.53 Such rigidity might arguably be inefficient, since sometimes
Sunday mowing may generate economic benefit to the gardener while
imposing no cost on the owner.54
Second, the doctrine may make it “more difficult [for the parties] to
create stable frameworks for renegotiation . . . .”55 Contract parties,
who anticipate that they will have to renegotiate particular aspects of
their contract, may intentionally draft written contractual clauses that
49. Merchant Law in a Modern Economy, supra note 25, at 257; see also Merchant Law in a R
Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1808; Matthew C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Col- R
laborative Economy, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 175, 179 (2010).
50. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 784 (“[P]ractices of mutual flexibility and leniency might be R
deterred if courts treat these practices as amendments to, or variations of, the parties’ explicit
contract.”); David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public and Pri-
vate Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 607, 637 (1999)
(“[T]oo exalted a role for course of performance results in disincentives to utility-enhancing ad-
justments in the ongoing relationship.”).
51. Ben-Shahar, supra note 10, at 784; Jennejohn, supra note 49, at 203–04; Juliet P. Kostrit- R
sky, Judicial Incorporation of Trade Usages: A Functional Solution to the Opportunism Prob-
lem, 39 CONN. L. REV. 451, 511–12 (2006); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad
Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpreta-
tion, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 92 (2008); Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, supra note 24, at R
896.
52. HILLMAN, supra note 10, at 255. R
53. HILLMAN, supra note 10, at 255. But see Professor Hillman’s criticism on this argument. R
HILLMAN, supra note 10, at 255. R
54. Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry, supra note 27, at 1743 (“There are often R
stages in a contracting relationship at which adjustments that create tremendous benefits to one
party while imposing minimal costs on the other can, in fact, be made; yet transactors would be
far less willing to make these adjustments if there was even a small risk that they might be
required to do so in the future, a risk that is very real in the public legal system due to the Code’s
. . . course of performance provisions.”). Moreover, it is theoretically argued that the course of
performance doctrine may encourage post-contractual opportunism. A party who failed to get a
specific right in the contract might insist that although the contract does include the right, it was
added to the contract by course of performance. See Jason Scott Johnston, Should the Law Ig-
nore Commercial Norms? A Comment on the Bernstein Conjecture and its Relevance for Contract
Law Theory and Reform, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1803 (2001).
55. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1807–08. R
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will set a stable benchmark for future renegotiation.56 However, if
contract parties predict that courts will apply their course of perform-
ance to modify the written contract, they may find it difficult to draft a
“stable framework for renegotiation.”57 As repeated and informal ad-
justments to the contract are often made by the parties, the doctrine
may imply that the written contract will be constantly modified, mak-
ing the written contractual framework unstable.58
Third, the application of the doctrine by courts suffers from several
limitations which may eventually harm the parties. First, the parties’
sequence of conduct, alleged by one of the parties in court, may be
derived from a relatively small amount of factual events.59 As a result,
courts would have difficulty distinguishing true patterns of behavior
from false ones.60 Relatedly, the court’s analysis of the factual evi-
dence relating to an alleged course of performance might be inaccu-
rate,61 given that judicial resources are limited.62 In addition, courts
have difficulty determining what degree of repetition of the behav-
ioral interactions between the parties is necessary.63 While a common
definition of course of performance requires “repeated occasions” for
performance by either party,64 it is often unclear how many occasions
56. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1811. R
57. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1811 (“[I]f transactors anticipate that R
courts will permit course of performance to alter the meaning of their written contract, it may be
difficult for them to draft provisions that will set a desirable and stable framework for
renegotiation.”).
58. Merchant Law in a Merchant Court, supra note 39, at 1811–12 (“As their contracting rela- R
tionship develops and repeated adjustments are made, the fact that in the event that renegoti-
ation fails, courts will look to course of performance in . . . deciding whether a . . .
modification of [the contract] terms has been made means that each transactor’s threat point in
the renegotiation, the point which defines the position that she will be in if renegotiation is
unsuccessful, will constantly change, making nearly any framework for renegotiation established
at the time of contracting inherently unstable.”).
59. Goetz & Scott, supra note 33, at 276 (“[T]he alleged patterns in the behavior of particular R
parties may be derived from a quite limited number of occurrences.”); Jennejohn, supra note 49, R
at 207 (The problem with relying on parties’ course of performance is that “courts have insuffi-
cient information from which to glean patterns in the disputants’ behavior.”).
60. Goetz & Scott, supra note 33, at 276 (“The number of observations may be so small that R
an observer would have difficulty distinguishing valid inferences from spurious ones.”).
61. Jennejohn, supra note 49, at 207; Johnston, supra note 54, at 1803 (“Even if the parties R
intended for such concessions to in fact modify their future obligations, there is much too high a
probability that courts will err in determining what the parties have actually done or said in their
prior dealings.”).
62. Jennejohn, supra note 49, at 207. R
63. HILLMAN, supra note 10, at 255 (“Courts have had little trouble determining when the R
parties have established a course of performance . . . .”); Goetz & Scott, supra note 33, at 276 R
(“Courts experience grave difficulty determining the degree of repetition necessary to establish a
‘course’ of conduct.”).
64. U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013); Stewart v. Screen Gems-
Emi Music, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 938, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Stalloy Metals, Inc. v. Kennametal,
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are needed in order to constitute the repetition necessary to establish
a course of performance.65
Given the profound theoretical debate over whether the course of
performance doctrine reflects the intentions of the parties, an impor-
tant question that arises is what the actual intention of the parties is.
The purpose of the next Part of this article is to address this question
empirically.
III. THE EMPIRICAL TEST
There is a rich theoretical debate over the whether the course of
performance doctrine reflects the intentions of the parties.66 However,
the existing debate lacks a quantitative, empirical analysis concentrat-
ing on the parties’ intentions. Focusing on the intentions of sophisti-
cated parties to commercial contracts, this chapter tests the frequency
with which anti-course of performance clauses, known as no-oral-
modification (NOM) clauses, are included in real-world commercial
contracts.
A. No-Oral-Modification Clause—A Brief Overview
A NOM clause is a contractual provision requiring modifications of
the written contract to be made only in writing.67 A typical NOM
clause states, inter alia: “The contract may be modified . . . only in a
writing . . . .”68 As implied by the text of a typical NOM clause, the
clause bars the modification of the contract not only orally but also by
course of performance.69 This is mainly because course of perform-
Inc., 983 N.E.2d 823, 835 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 202(4) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
65. Goetz & Scott, supra note 33, at 276 n.41 (stating that the U.C.C. does not supply “gui- R
dance on how many acts are needed” in order to establish a course of performance).
66. See supra Part II.
67. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Interpretation of International Contracts and the Use of Pream-
bles, 2002 INT’L BUS. L.J. 271, 274 [hereinafter The Interpretation of International Contracts and
the Use of Preambles] (stating that a NOM clause recites that “no modification of the contract is
valid unless in writing.”); Heather Piotrowski, Legalizing Fraud in Michigan Contract Law, 58
WAYNE L. REV. 139, 152 n.97 (2012) (explaining that a NOM clause requires that “any modifica-
tions to the written document must be in writing.”); Ma del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Modifica-
tion and Termination of the Contract (Art. 29 CISG), 25 J.L. & COM. 167, 170 (2005) (stating that
NOM clauses “do not allow for the modification of the contract unless that modification is
made in writing.”).
68. FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 258. R
69. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 592 (arguing that courts should be reluctant to admit R
course-of-performance evidence to show a change in the meaning of the contract “when the
contract contains a term requiring modifications to be in writing.”); The Interpretation of Interna-
tional Contracts and the Use of Preambles, supra note 67, at 277. The contract drafter can use, R
inter alia, a no-oral-modification clause in an attempt to prevent post-contractual conduct from
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ance is a sequence of conduct,70 which by its very nature does not
constitute a “writing.” In essence, a NOM clause is, among other
things, an anti-course of performance clause.
Importantly, the inclusion of a NOM clause in a contract reflects an
effort by the parties to prevent the application of the course of per-
formance doctrine. However, the enforceability of NOM clauses
under U.S. law is unclear.71 While some courts are reluctant to enforce
NOM clauses,72 other courts tend to uphold such clauses.73 The latter
courts particularly bar the modification of the contract through course
of performance, where the contract includes a NOM clause.74 Given
modifying the contract. The Interpretation of International Contracts and the Use of Preambles,
supra note 67, at 277. R
70. See supra text accompanying note 8. R
71. Martin H. Brinkley, The Regulation of Contractual Change: A Guide to No Oral Modifica-
tion Clauses for North Carolina Lawyers, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2239, at 2245–46 (2003) (“North Caro-
lina law on the enforceability of NOM . . . clauses, like the law of some other states and
federal jurisdictions, is undeveloped and confused.”); The Interpretation of International Con-
tracts and the Use of Preambles, supra note 67, at 274 (explaining that the law on the effect of R
NOM clauses “is uncertain.”); Robert A. Hillman, Article 29(2) of the United Nations Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A New Effort at Clarifying the Legal Effect
of No Oral Modification Clauses, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 449, 449 (1988) [hereinafter Article
29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods] (“The
legal effect of NOM clauses in this country is shrouded in mystery.”).
72. See, e.g., Gaia House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 720 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Harold J. Rosen Tr. v. Rosen, 386 N.Y.S.2d 491, 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)) (“[A]ny
written agreement, even one which provides that it cannot be modified except by a writing
signed by the parties, can be effectively modified by a course of actual performance.”); In re
Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 554 F.3d 382, 410 (3d Cir. 2009) (“New York law provides that any
contract may be modified by a course of performance, even if that contract otherwise requires
modifications to be in writing.”); Prusky v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., No. 02-6010, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32856, at *53 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2005) (“Pennsylvania courts, nevertheless, have allowed
modification of a written agreement, even with a no-oral modifications clause, by subsequent
parol negotiation or action of the parties.”); Fraher Transit, Inc. v. Aldi, Inc., 2009-Ohio-336,
¶ 13, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 281, 2009 WL 187937 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he no-oral-modi-
fication clause has not garnered favor in the law.”).
73. See, e.g., Oki Distrib. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 637, 641 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(“[U]nder Iowa law, where a signed contract contains a clause excluding modification or recision
[sic] except by a signed writing, the contract cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded.”); Benz
Farm, LLP v. Cavendish Farms, Inc., 2011 ND 184, ¶ 12, 803 N.W.2d 818, 823 (N.D. 2011) (“No-
oral modification clauses are enforced under North Dakota law.”); Healy v. Williams, 818 N.Y.S.
121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“As a general rule, where a contract has a provision which
explicitly prohibits oral modification, such clause is afforded great deference . . . .”); Leasing
Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 464 A.2d 402, 407 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (“Our law generally upholds the
validity and sanctity of no-oral modification clauses.”).
74. See, e.g., Oki Distrib., 850 F. Supp. at 641 (“[W]here, as here, a contractual clause prohib-
its any modification which is not embodied in a signed writing, the parties are barred under Iowa
law from modifying the contract . . . through . . . course of conduct.”); Yackobovitz v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., 590 A.2d 40, 48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (“Because of the ‘no modification unless
in writing’ clause, the City’s conduct of assuming roadbed maintenance could not operate to
permanently change the contract . . . .”); see also U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (“A signed agreement which
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the chances that a NOM clause will be enforced by some courts, par-
ties willing to avoid the application of the course of performance doc-
trine are likely to include the clause in their contract.75 Accordingly,
the frequency with which NOM clauses are included by the parties in
real-world contracts can indicate the intention of the parties regarding
the course of performance doctrine.
B. The Theoretical Hypotheses
This Article hypothesizes that sophisticated parties are likely to in-
clude a NOM clause in their commercial contracts. A NOM clause—
by requiring contract modifications to be made only in writing—has
several significant organizational benefits for sophisticated parties,
which were mostly overlooked in the theoretical debate over the de-
sirability of the course of performance doctrine.76 To begin with, docu-
menting contract modifications in writing can assist sophisticated
parties in systematic ex ante evaluation of the potential economic im-
plications of the proposed written changes.77 Such an evaluation might
be particularly important for sophisticated parties since contract mod-
ifications may have significant financial ramifications for the parties.
Contract modifications may terminate important rights afforded
under the original agreement or add new substantial duties, which
cannot be withdrawn unilaterally.78 In addition, modifying a contract
in writing allows the parties to refer back to the documented modifica-
tions in order to accurately and efficiently perform the modification
after it was made.79 Such written reference points might be particu-
excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or
rescinded . . . .”).
75. Cf. The Interpretation of International Contracts and the Use of Preambles, supra note 67, R
at 273 (stating that the chances that a NOM clause will be enforced by US courts “is clearly
sufficient to merit the inclusion of such a clause.”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 592 R
(arguing that an inference that the parties want modifications to be written is compelling “when
the contract contains a term requiring modifications to be in writing.”).
76. For the theoretical debate over the desirability of the course of performance doctrine, see
Part II supra.
77. For a description of the systematic evaluation process potentially conducted by sophisti-
cated parties before making a contractual change see, for example, INT’L ASS’N FOR CONTRACT
& COMMERCIAL MGMT., CONTRACT & COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT—THE OPERATIONAL
GUIDE 570–71 (2011) [hereinafter THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE].
78. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 13, 15. R
79. Gregory A. Garrett & Rene G. Rendon, The Contract Changes Management Process:
Managing and Controlling Contract Changes, CONT. MGMT. 54, 59 (October 2012) [hereinafter
The Contract Changes Management Process] (“A formal contract changes management process
and related documentation are essential elements of . . . ensuring successful performance results
such as: [o]n-time delivery; [o]n-budget completion of the work; and [q]uality products, services,
and systems provided to the customer.”); see also J. Timothy Sprehe, The Positive Benefits of
Electronic Records Management in the Context of Enterprise Content Management, 22 GOV. INF.
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larly beneficial for sophisticated parties who enter into many complex
commercial contracts,80 as these may have undergone many modifica-
tions throughout their long-term life cycles.81
Likewise, written contract modifications can help the members of
each party to refer back to the documented modifications in order to
monitor the performance of the contractual modifications by the other
party.82 Moreover, the documentation of contract modifications in
writing can assist sophisticated parties in ex post evaluation of whether
their past modifications were efficient or wasteful.83 In addition, no-
tice of written contractual modifications can be easily sent to relevant
stakeholders, such as shareholders, company directors, and inves-
tors,84 as opposed to a non-written course of performance. Written
contractual changes may also aid sophisticated parties in obtaining
loans from banks, since banks may decide whether to approve loans
based on written and updated contracts between the parties.85
Q. 297, 298 (2005) (“Records ensure that an enterprise can . . . conduct its business in an orderly,
efficient and accountable manner . . . .”).
80. Jason Scott Johnston, Statutes of Frauds, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS AND LAW 530, 532 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“[I]n a large business with many, complex
contractual relationships, it would simply be impossible to perform efficiently without some re-
cord of what had been promised.”); see also Small Business Administration, Record Keeping for
a Small Business 6, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/PARTICIPANT_GUIDE_REC
ORD_KEEPING.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (“Without a proper record keeping system,
tracking important details of your business may be impossible.”).
81. THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 77, at 561 (“[W]here a project extends over a long
period of time, change is inevitable. Static conditions are very rare . . . .”); GREGORY A. GAR-
RETT, MANAGING CONTRACT CHANGES 3 (2013) [hereinafter GARRETT] (“Change is inevitable
in contract and project management.”).
82. The Contract Changes Management Process, supra note 79, at 58 (“For the contract
changes process, contract administration ensures that the new effort reflected in the contract
change is performed by the contractor in accordance with the revised contract requirements.”).
83. Dep’t of Treasury, Starting a Business and Keeping Records 11 (Jan. 14, 2015), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p583.pdf (“Records can show whether your business is improving, which
items are selling, or what changes you need to make.”); THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE, supra note
77, at 564 (explaining that contract managers are advised to “[m]ake sure [their contract] change
control process reviews this type of change periodically to ensure [they] are not suffering cumu-
lative effects . . . .”).
84. See, e.g., Elizabeth Shepherd, Why Are Records in the Public Sector Organizational As-
sets?, 16 RECORDS MGMT. J. 6, 11 (2006) (stating that effective record management protects “the
interests and rights of stakeholders . . . .”); Sprehe, supra note 79, at 298 (“Records ensure that
an enterprise can . . .  document its policies, decisions, and outcomes to stakeholders . . . .”);
Record Keeping Guidance, OECD CTR. FOR TAX POLICY & ADMIN. 7, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/
administration/31663114.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (explaining that keeping records allows
businesses to “satisfy external auditors, company directors, shareholders, creditors, investors and
other interested stakeholders that the records reflect a true and fair value of the business”).
85. Record Keeping Guidance, supra note 84, at 7 (“On the basis of the financial documents
and statements . . . banks decide whether to provide loans or other financial means . . . .”).
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Written contract modifications can also help the parties to protect
themselves against lawsuits.86 Such documentation provides evidence
about the implementation and contents of a contractual modifica-
tion.87 Therefore, it may reduce the probability that a party will falsely
testify in court that the parties modified the contract through their
conduct.88 In the same vein, written modifications—by serving as for-
mal evidence—can assist a party to secure its legal rights and file a
lawsuit against a party who breached a documented modification.89
Lastly, the written modification can help the parties to settle disputes
out of court.90 An absence of a written record complicates litigation,
as memories regarding past conduct may fade, and some employees
involved in the conduct may now be former employees.91
Given the significant benefits of modifying contracts in writing, it is
not surprising that the contract management literature recommends
86. See e.g., KAREN L. SAMPSON, VALUE-ADDED RECORDS MANAGEMENT 11 (2d ed. 2002)
(explaining that a written agreement may “help reduce the risk of being sued”); Sprehe, supra
note 79, at 298 (“Records ensure that an enterprise can . . . protect itself in litigation . . . .”); see
also Lydon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 91-11971-NG, 1997 WL 260064, at *9 (D. Mass. May
9, 1997) (“[N]o oral modification clauses have a valid business purpose, to the extent they serve
to reduce legitimate uncertainty about such fertile grounds for dispute as whether the parties
intended to bind themselves to a modification of some kind; what the precise terms of the modi-
fication were; and whether the party who purported to approve the purported modification had
actual authority to do so.”).
87. See, e.g., THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 77, at 398 (“Most sales employees under-
stand the value of having a written document describing the business deal so that clear evidence
of the deal and its terms is available if a dispute arises.”); see also Robert A. Hillman, Standards
for Revising Article 2 of the UCC: The NOM Clause Model, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1509, 1523
(1994) [hereinafter Hillman, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the UCC]; Shepherd, supra note
84, at 4 (“[A] failure to create adequate records . . . may have more serious consequences. The
organization may be unable to prove that it did what it was supposed to do . . . ; it may be unable
to defend itself if liability claims are made against its services or the actions of its employees
. . . .”).
88. See e.g., Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1287 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Judge Posner explains that “[t]he main purpose of forbidding oral modifications is to prevent
the promisor from fabricating a modification that will let him escape his obligations under the
contract . . . .”); see also Article 29(2) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, supra note 71, at 450 (stating that parties include a NOM clause in
order to “prevent fraudulent or mistaken claims of modification of a written agreement.”); Hill-
man, Standards for Revising Article 2 of the UCC, supra note 87.
89. See e.g., Shepherd, supra note 84, at 4 (“[A] failure to create adequate records . . . may
have more serious consequences. The organization may . . . be unable to prove its rights . . . .”).
90. SAMPSON, supra note 86, at 11 (stating that a written agreement may “help persuade a
plaintiff to drop a lawsuit . . . .”).
91. THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 77, at 564 (2014) (“Even if it is agreed that a [con- R
tract] change has no visible effect on the contract terms it should still be recorded . . . ; otherwise
it might become later a source of dispute . . . .”); Melissa Dewey Brumback, Managing Contract
Change 5 (2006), http://ddryy2o5sc51c.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/MANAGING
.pdf (“Avoid oral change orders if at all possible. Memories fade. People leave. Once any litiga-
tion occurs, you can guarantee that many of those oral conversations will be in hot dispute.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-1\DPL102.txt unknown Seq: 18  7-JAN-19 10:02
18 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1
documenting contract modifications in writing.92 This Article there-
fore hypothesizes that commercial contracts between sophisticated
parties will typically include a NOM clause, requiring contract modifi-
cations to be made only in writing.
In addition, this Article hypothesizes that contracts that include
other “in-writing” clauses are more likely to include a NOM clause.
In-writing clauses, as defined in this Article, are contractual clauses
that require post-contractual actions of the parties, other than con-
tract modification, to be made in writing. Relatively common exam-
ples of in-writing clauses are: (1) an anti-waiver clause, which states
that any waiver of contractual obligations must be made in writing; (2)
an anti-assignment clause, under which neither party may assign its
contractual rights or obligations without the other party’s written con-
sent; and (3) a notices clause, which states that all notices under the
agreement shall be in writing.
Given their nature, in-writing clauses reflect the parties’ preference
for written recordkeeping of all post-contractual actions, such as
waiver, assignment, or notice. This Article assumes that if the parties
indicate their preference for writing by utilizing in-writing clauses,
they are more likely to utilize a NOM clause in their contract. This is
because a NOM clause supports the parties’ existing preferences for
written recordkeeping, as reflected in the in-writing clauses. This Arti-
cle proposes four hypotheses.
Hypothesis One (H1): A NOM clause is more likely than not to
appear in commercial contracts between sophisticated parties.
92. GARRETT, supra note 81, at 32 (“Document and execute all contract changes through
formal modifications to the contract.”); INT’L ASS’N FOR CONTRACT & COMMERCIAL MGMT,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT 249 (2013) (“Even if it is
agreed that a change has no visible effect on the contract terms it should still be recorded . . . .”);
THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 77, at 572 (“Ensure the [contract] change records all
aspects of the changes to the contract. These should be drafted . . . between the customer and the
supplier and identify the specific change(s) in the contract wording to ensure there is always an
up to date version of the contract avoiding the possible misunderstanding[s] . . . .”); The Contract
Changes Management Process, supra note 79, at 61 (“Formally approved changes to the project
should be in writing . . . .”); GARRETT, supra note 81, at 51 (“Any change to a contract should be
executed through a formal contract modification process and documented appropriately.”); see
also, Community Services Contract Management Practice Guide, GOV’T W. AUSTL. 25 (July
2016), http://www.finance.wa.gov.au/cms/uploadedFiles/Government_Procurement/Guide-
lines_and_templates/Community_Services_Templates_and_Guides/cs_contract_management_
practice_guide.pdf (“[S]ervice agreement managers should ensure that any proposed changes to
a service agreement are managed in accordance with formal procedures as follows . . . each step
of the action taken is recorded, with any changes incorporated in the service agreement by a
formal variation to the original . . . .”); Contract Management Guidelines, MAV PROCUREMENT
20, http://www.mav.asn.au/what-we-do/procurement/resources (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (“Key
issues to consider when managing contract variations include . . . [p]roperly documenting details
of the variation . . . .”).
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Hypothesis Two (H2): Contracts that include an anti-waiver clause
are more likely to include a NOM clause than contracts without an
anti-waiver clause.
Hypothesis Three (H3): Contracts that include an anti-assignment
clause are more likely to include a NOM clause than contracts without
an anti-assignment clause.
Hypothesis Four (H4): Contracts that include a notices clause are
more likely to include a NOM clause than contracts without a notices
clause.
C. Data
The sample of this empirical study is based on commercial contracts
included as exhibits to filings with the SEC.93 This study covers a five-
year period from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2018. The resulting
final sample comprises 1,550 commercial contracts. These contracts
were located via Westlaw’s commercial law sample-agreement search
engine.94 The Westlaw sample-agreements database has contracts in-
cluded in all SEC filings during the sample period.95
The contracts analyzed in this study particularly survey Form 8-K
filings with the SEC. Form 8-K includes information which is consid-
93. For the same methodological approach of analyzing contracts contained as exhibits to
Form 8-K filings with the SEC, see Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, & Emily Sherwin,
Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non-
consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 880 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance: Lessons from Commercial Contracts, 12 J. EM-
PIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 43 (2015) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Damages Versus Specific
Performance]; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from
an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 539, 550 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, Do Juries Add Value?]; Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An
Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 349 (2013); Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of
Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1983 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration
Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 348 (2007) [here-
inafter Eisenberg & Miller, The Flight from Arbitration]; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum
Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1487 (2009).
94. In order to exclude contracts that were merely an amendment to a contract, I searched via
Westlaw’s search engine only for contracts that included in their title the following terms: (agree-
ment! or contract!) % amendment!. The “!” symbol was used to search for words with multiple
endings, and the “%” symbol was used to exclude the term following the percent symbol. See
WESTLAW, https://lawschool.westlaw.com/marketing/display/RE/152 (last visited Dec. 10, 2017)
[hereinafter Terms and Connectors Searches]. I also excluded exhibits that were apparently
duplicates, as witnessed by their title and date.
95. Sample Agreements, THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-
products/westlaw-legal-research/transactions/sample-agreements (last visited Jan. 1, 2018).
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ered to be material.96 Generally put, a reasonable investor is likely to
consider material obligations and rights to be “important in making an
investment decision.”97 This information must specifically include the
entry of the company into a “material definitive agreement.”98 This
agreement provides for obligations or rights that are material to the
filing company.99
The commercial contracts examined in this study are highly hetero-
geneous and include the following: distribution, agency, consulting,
management services, cooperation, independent contractor, market-
ing, licensing, financing, and manufacturing agreements.100 The major
types of contracts, as reflected in the contracts’ titles, are shown in
Table 1.
96. Investor Bulletin: How to Read an 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N: SEC OFFICE OF INV’R
EDUC. & ADVOCACY (May 22, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/readan8k.pdf.




100. A commercial contract, as opposed to a consumer or employment contract, is typically an
agreement between two or more business entities. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 37, at 543 R
(“Even a theory of contract law that focuses only on the enforcement of bargains must still
consider the entire continuum from standard form contracts between firms and consumers to
commercial contracts among businesses.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The
Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1198 (2006)
(“Consumer contracts differ from commercial contracts between businesses.”); see also Joshua
M. Silverstein, Using the West Key Number System as a Data Collection and Coding Device for
Empirical Legal Scholarship: Demonstrating the Method Via a Study of Contract Interpretation,
34 J.L. & COM. 203, 261 (2016).
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Table 1. Number and percentage of contracts by type.
Type Number101 Percentage102  Type Number Percentage 




Consulting or  
Advisory 
159 10.26 Supply 28 1.81 
Agency 133 8.58 
Administrative 
Services 27 1.74 
Management  
Services 
133 8.58 Purchase 25 1.61 








Contractor 63 4.06 Storage 17 1.10 
Licensing 57 3.68 Research 9 0.58 
Development 41 2.65 Advertising 7 0.45 
Manufacturing 40 2.58 Assignment 4 0.26 




The industries of the companies that filed these contracts with the
SEC are also heterogeneous and include the following: advertising,
agriculture, banking, beverage, biological products, business services,
cosmetic, electricity, hotels and motels, management services, medical
instruments, metal mining, patents, pharmaceutical, real estate, res-
taurant, software, television, transportation, and wholesale.103
D. Methodology
In order to locate contracts with a NOM clause, I took the following
main steps: First, I conducted an in-depth review of the full text of 100
random commercial contracts in the sample. The purpose of this re-
view was to identify the terms commonly associated with a NOM
clause. Second, based on my in-depth review I conducted an online
search, using Westlaw’s Terms and Connectors search engine, for con-
101. Number of contracts by contract type (sample size n = 1,550).
102. Percentage of contracts by contract type (sample size n = 1,550).
103. The companies industries were located via the EDGAR company search engine. See ED-
GAR: Company Filings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
companysearch.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2018).
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tracts containing terms commonly associated with a NOM clause.104
This search included the following terms: (“modif! /s writ!”) or
(“amend! /s writ!”).105 The “!” symbol was used to search for words
with multiple endings, and the “/s” symbol was used to search for
terms in the same sentence.106 Contracts with a NOM clause were
coded “1.” Finally, in order to verify that the search results for terms
commonly associated with a NOM clause were not overinclusive, I
manually coded an audit of 100 random contracts which were coded
“1.” The audit was successful.107
In order to locate contracts with in-writing clauses, I took the fol-
lowing steps for each type of in-writing clause: First, I conducted an
in-depth review of the full text of 100 random commercial contracts in
the sample in order to identify the terms commonly associated with in-
writing clauses. Second, based on this review, I conducted an online
search, using Westlaw’s Terms and Connectors search engine, for con-
tracts containing terms commonly associated with in-writing clauses.
For example, to determine whether a contract included an anti-assign-
ment clause, which requires written consent for an assignment, I
searched via Westlaw’s Terms and Connectors search engine for the
term “assign! /s writ! /s consent.”108 Contracts with an in-writing
clause were coded “1.”
Finally, in order to verify that my search results for terms commonly
associated with in-writing clauses were not overinclusive, I manually
coded an audit of 100 random contracts which were coded “1.” The
audit was successful.109
E. Results
Out of 1,550 contracts, 1,241 (80.06%) included a NOM clause and
309 (19.94%) did not include a NOM clause. An exact Fisher test was
104. For a similar methodological approach applied on a “specific performance” clause, see
Eisenberg & Miller, Damages Versus Specific Performance, supra note 93, at 44. R
105. I also searched, via Westlaw’s “Clause Title” search function, for contracts with the fol-
lowing clause titles: “modification!” and “amendment!”.
106. Terms and Connectors Searches, supra note 94. R
107. Out of 100 results, no result was overinclusive.
108. For all other in-writing clauses, my search included the following terms: “waiv! /s writ!”;
“notices /s ‘in writ!’”; and “‘any notice’ /s writ!”. I also searched, via Westlaw’s “Clause Title”
search function, for contracts with the title “notices”, in order to locate additional notices
clauses.
109. Out of 100 results, only 2 (2%) were overinclusive.
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performed,110 and it was statistically found that a NOM clause appears
significantly more often than not (p < 0.001),111 thus supporting H1.112
The results also support H2–H4.113 Table 2 shows the frequency and
percentage of contracts with and without a NOM clause for each in-
writing clause. In order to test for H2–H4, a basic exact Fisher test was
performed. It showed a significant statistical relationship between
each of the explanatory variables (the anti-waiver, anti-assignment,
and notices clauses) and the outcome variable NOM clause (p < 0.001
for all three explanatory variables).
Table 2. Cross tabulation of a NOM clause
and other in-writing clauses.
Clause Type in Contract Total
With NOM Clause Without NOM Clause 
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Anti-Waiver Clause 692  676  97.69 16 2.31 
No Anti-Waiver Clause 858  565  65.85 293  34.15 
Anti-Assignment Clause 653  624  95.56 29  4.44 
Without Anti-Assignment 
Clause 897  617 68.78 280   31.22 
Notices Clause 1163  028  88.39 135   11.61 
Without Notices Clause 387  213  55.04 174  44.96 
In addition, the results of logistic regression models—with a NOM
clause as the outcome variable and the anti-waiver, anti-assignment,
and notices clauses as the explanatory variables—were examined.
First, I constructed a univariate model to test hypotheses H2–H4 and
to obtain crude odds ratios (OR),114 and respective 95% confidence
intervals (CI). I found that a contract with an anti-waiver clause was
110. This test is used to examine whether there is a nonrandom association between two cate-
gorical variables. See Eric W. Weisstein, Fisher’s Exact Test, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://
mathworld.wolfram.com/FishersExactTest.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
111. The P-value (p) signifies the likelihood of obtaining an effect equal to or more extreme
than the one observed, assuming the null hypothesis is true. See David Jean Biau et al., P Value
and the Theory of Hypothesis Testing, 468 CLINIC ORTHOPEDIC & RELATED RES. 885, 886
(2010). The smaller the P-value, the more doubtful the null hypothesis is. Id.
112. See supra Part III.B (“Hypothesis One (H1): A NOM clause is more likely than not to
appear in commercial contracts between sophisticated parties.”).
113. See supra Part III.B (“Hypothesis Two (H2): Contracts that include an anti-waiver clause
are more likely to include a NOM clause than contracts without an anti-waiver clause. Hypothe-
sis Three (H3): Contracts that include an anti-assignment clause are more likely to include a
NOM clause than contracts without an anti-assignment clause. Hypothesis Four (H4): Contracts
that include a notices clause are more likely to include a NOM clause than contracts without a
notices clause.”).
114. The OR signifies the odds that an outcome will happen given a specific exposure, com-
pared to the odds of that outcome happening without the same exposure. See, Magdalena Szumi-
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associated with 21.9 (95% CI: 13.5, 38.2) greater odds of including a
NOM clause; the ORs and 95% CIs for anti-assignment and notices
clauses were 9.8 (6.7, 14.8) and 6.2 (4.8, 8.2), respectively (p < 0.001
for all three tests). These results are indicated in Table 3. H2-H4 are
therefore supported.115 In addition, an additive multivariate model
was fitted containing all three clauses—anti-waiver, anti-assignment
and notices—additively in the model. The results in Table 3 indicate
some effect attenuation for all clauses, but all estimates are still highly
significant (p < 0.001).
Table 3. Results of univariate and additive
logistic regression models.
 
Univariate models Multivariate  
additive model 





clause model  
 
Anti-Waiver 21.9 (13.5, 38.2) - - 11.2  
(6.8, 19.8) 
Anti-Assignment - 9.8 (6.7, 14.8) - 4.4  
(2.9, 6.8) 
Notices - - 6.2 (4.8, 8.2) 3.2  
(2.4, 4.3) 
Notes: All estimates are statistically significant (p < 0.001), N = 1550. Crude odd rate
(OR) and confidence interval (CI) at 95%.
IV. DISCUSSION AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The results of this empirical study indicate that most sophisticated
parties to commercial contracts resent the course of performance doc-
trine. The study shows that a clear majority (80.06%) of commercial
contracts filed with the SEC have a NOM clause, requiring modifica-
tions of the contract to be made only in writing.
One major legal implication of these results is the need to modify
the default modification rules currently governing commercial con-
tracts between sophisticated parties. Due to the fact that most of these
contracts contain a NOM clause, the default rules should align with
the majority’s preferences. Specifically, the default rules should man-
date that modifications to commercial contracts must be made only in
las, Explaining Odds Ratios, 19 J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 227, 227
(2010).
115. In addition, a basic exact Fisher test was performed. It also showed a statistical relation-
ship between each of the explanatory variables (anti-waiver, anti-assignment, and notices clause)
and the outcome variable NOM clause (P<0.001 for all three explanatory variables).
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writing, while also prohibiting any and all modifications by way of
non-written course of performance.
Those desiring to opt out from the new default modification rules
presented are the minority of parties to such contracts. By mirroring
the majority’s preferences, the law would reduce the financial expen-
diture of most sophisticated parties on transaction costs associated
with commercial contracts. This would, in turn, create a system where
only the minority will have to negotiate and draft anti-NOM clauses
that state inter alia, that the contract “may be modified by non-written
course of performance.” Such an innovative legal reality will reduce
transaction costs for most parties, as they will no longer have to nego-
tiate and draft NOM clauses.
One could argue that the results of this study are severely limited if
the NOM clauses in the sample are mere boilerplates, i.e., the NOM
clauses in the sample contracts were included by the parties without
any actual intent. There are several reasons why this is an unlikely
scenario.
First, the sample used in this empirical study comprises contracts
included as exhibits to Form 8-K filings with the SEC. Companies file
the Form 8-K to report material corporate events, a subset of which is
“material definitive agreements.”116 Per the SEC, material definitive
agreements are ones that provide for obligations or rights that are ma-
terial to the SEC filing company.117 Since the contracts comprising the
sample are material to the registrant, i.e., the filing company, it is
likely “that they receive[d] care and attention during negotiation and
drafting” from company employees, including in-house counsel, as
well as qualified outside attorneys.118
Second, the sample in this study comprises only commercial con-
tracts in which one of the parties is a sophisticated entity that is legally
obligated to report to the SEC. These companies usually have more
than $10 million in assets and their securities are held by more than
500 owners.119 Given the level of screening and qualification standards
required of sophisticated SEC filing companies, it is plausible that the
counterparties to the sample commercial contracts included in this
study are relatively sophisticated business entities as well. Crucially,
this sample does not include commercial contracts between non-so-
phisticated parties nor non-commercial contracts, such as employment
116. How to Read an 8-K, supra note 97.
117. How to Read an 8-K, supra note 97.
118. Do Juries Add Value?, supra note 93, at 582; see also, The Flight from Arbitration, supra R
note 93, at 349. R
119. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2012).
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and consumer agreements. By that the sample assures, with a poten-
tial slight margin of error, that the NOM clauses observed in this data
set were understood and freely agreed on by both parties.120
Third, the empirical results obtained indicate that the NOM clauses
included in the sample contracts are not random boilerplates. More
specifically, the results show that contracts containing fundamental in-
writing clauses, such as an anti-waiver clause, an anti-assignment
clause, and a notices clause, are significantly more likely to include a
NOM clause than contracts without such in-writing clauses.121
CONCLUSION
This Article empirically examines the frequency with which anti-
course of performance clauses are included in commercial contracts
between sophisticated parties. This Article empirically demonstrates,
by analyzing actual commercial contracts, that sophisticated parties to
commercial contracts are likely to resent the application of the course
of performance doctrine by the courts. The study further shows that
the inclusion of an anti-course of performance clause by most parties
is not arbitrary. The inclusion of clauses that are related to an anti-
course of performance clause, such as anti-waiver, anti-assignment, or
notices clauses, is significantly associated with the inclusion of an anti-
course of performance clause.
While this study focuses on commercial contracts between sophisti-
cated entities, there is room for further empirical research on the in-
tentions of the parties regarding the course of performance doctrine.
This study can be expanded upon by empirically investigating the
preferences of non-sophisticated parties to commercial contracts and
to non-commercial contracts.
120. Damages Versus Specific Performance, supra note 93, at 31. R
121. See supra Part III.E.
